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THE AMERICAN LAW, INSTITUTE'S

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS ANNOTATED WITH KENTUCKY DECISIONS*
By FIRANK MURRAY**
WHEN AN ACCEPTANOE INOPERATIVE
Section 68.
DESPATCtED IS OPFRATIVE UPON RECEIPT OF OPPEROR.

WHEN

An acceptance inoperative when despatched only because
the offeree uses means of transmission which he was not authorized to use is operative when received, if received by the offeror
within the time within which an acceptance sent in an authorized
manner would probably have been received by hun.
Annotatson
No Kentucky cases.
-Seemingly this section must be qualified by Section 61 ante.

Section 69. WHT CONSTITUTES RECEIPT OF REVOCATION,
REJECTION, OR ACCEPTANCE.
A written revocation, rejection or acceptance is received
when the writing comes into the possession of the person addressed, or of some person authorized by him to receive it for
him, or is deposited in some place which he has authorized as the
place for this or similar communications to be deposited for
hbm.
Comment
a. Under Section 41, a revocation when sent from a distance must be received in order to be effectual. Under Section
61 acceptance from a distance need not be received if started on
its way in a method authorized, unless receipt is made a condi*This is a continuation of the Kentucky Annotations to the Restatement of Contracts. The work is being done by Professor Frank
Murray of the College of Law, University of Kentucky in co-operation
with the Kentucky State Bar Association. The publication of material
for this issue has been shortened in order to publish other material.
**Frank Murray, A. B., Univ. of Montana; LL. B. 1925, Univ. of
Montana; S. J. D. 1930, Harvard Univ., Asst. Prof. of Law, Univ. of
Montana School of Law, 1928-1929; Prof. of Law, Univ. of Kentucky
College of Law since 1930.
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tion of the offer.

This, however, may be the case. and though

there is no such condition, an acceptance sent by an unauthor-

ized method may, under Section 68, create a contract when
received by the offeror. 'What amounts to receipt in all these
cases is defined by the present Section, under which a written
communication may be received though it is not read or though
it does not even reach the hands of the person to whom it io
addressed.
Annotation
There are no Kentucky cases defining receipt. Dicta in Postal Tel.
0. Co. v. Louisville Cotton Seed Oil Co., 140 Ky. 506, 131 S. W 277,
may be of some value.

Section 70. AN OFFEROR OR ACCEPTOR OP A WRrTTEN
OFFER IS BouND By ITS TERMS.
One who makes a written offer which is accepted, or who
manifests acceptance of the terms of a writing which he should
reasonably understand to be an offer or proposed contract, is
bound by the contract, though ignorant of the terms of the writing or of its proper interpretation.
Comment
a. The effect of fraud and mistake as ground for avoiding
a contract induced thereby is stated in a later portion of this
Restatement. When mistake prevents the existence of a contract
is stated in Section 71.
Annotation
This statement is in accord with our decisions. See Brown v.
Central Life Ins. Co., 241 Ky. 514, 44 S. W (2) 514 (1931), and cases
cited to which may be added: J I. Case Co. v. Mattingly, 142 Ky. 581,
134 S. W 1131, Blake v. Black Bear Coal Co., 145 Ky. 788, 141 S. W
403; Case Mill Mfg. Co. v. Vickers, 147 Ky. 396, 144 S. W 76; United
Talksng Machine Co. v. Metcalf, 164 Ky. 258, 175 S. W 357.
In most of the decisions cited above, the rule is stated as applicable only in case the one signing the paper can read it and has a reasonable opportunity to do so. This qualification is the result of dicta
in early cases, is not in accord with the weight of authority in other
jurisdictions, and was not necessary in the decision of the cases cited.
However, if there is a misrepresentation as to the content or the signer
is prevented from reading it by other fraud it seems that he may avoid
the obligation.-Ross v. Oliver Bros. & Ioneycutt, 152 Ky. 437, 153
S. W 756 (1913), Germer v. Gambill, 140 Ky. 469, 131 S. W 268 (1910).
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Signing the paper is not necessary for the application of this rule.
It is possible for the parties, if they so intend, to adopt an unsigned
writing, or a writing signed by only one of the parties, as their contract, or as evidence of the terms of an oral agreement. Pne who so
accepts such a paper is bound by its terms whether he reads it or notL. d- N. B. B. Co. v. Brownlee, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 590 (1879) (bill of
lading), McGregor v. Metropolitan L. I. Co., 143 Ky. 488, 136 S. W
889 (terms in the receipt given by the agent as well as those in the
signed application are part of the agreement although not read by the
insured), see also dicta in the following cases: FranklinFire Ins. Co.
v. Hewitt, Allison &-Co., 42 Ky. (3 B. M.) 231 (holding that delivery
of a fire insurance policy and retention for four months by the clerk
of the insured was not a sufficient acceptance to invoke the rule),
Bowen v. Chenoa-Hignite Coal Co., 168 Ky. 588, 182 S. W 635 (contract
of employment), Sprzngfield F & M. Ins. Co. v. Snowden, 173 Ky. 664,
191 S. W 439 (fire insurance).
However, it seems that a different rule may be applied in case of
railroad tickets. Although the printing on the ticket is conclusive evidence of the contract as between the passenger, and a conductor, still,
as between the purchaser and the company, "the -ticket is a mere
memorandum of a contract, the real and true details of which are
entered into before the delivery of the ticket" and one accepting a
ticket for a different destination than that requested and paid for, or
stamped with a different time limit than that represented by the
agent, may, if elected, recover "ex contractu"--L. & N. B. B. Co. v.
Sandlin, 209 Ky. 442, 272 S. W. 912 (1925), Ill. Cent. By. Co. v. Flem.
ng, 148 Ky. 473, 146 S. W 1110 (1912), C. N. 0. d T P By. Co. v.
Carson, 145 Ky. 81, 140 S. W. 71 (1911), L. & N. B. B. Co. v. Fish, 127
S. W 519; So. By. Co. v. Hawkins, 121 Ky. 415, 89 S. W 258 (1905),
Ill. Cent. v. Jackson, 117 Ky. 900, 79 S. W. 1187 (1904), L. C E. By.
Co. v. Lyons, 104 Ky. 23, 46 S. W 209 (1898).

Section 71.

tTNDISCLOSED UNDERSTANDING OF OFFEROR OR

OppFERnE, WHEN M1ATERIAI.
Except as stated in Sections 55 and 70, the undisclosed
understanding of either party of the meaning of his own words
and other acts, or of the other party's words and other acts, is
material m the formation of contracts in the following cases and
m no others
a. If the manifestations of intention of either party are
uncertain or ambiguous, and he has no reason to know that they
may bear a different meaning to the other party from that which
he himself attaches to them, his manifestations are operative in
the formation of a contract only in the Pvent that the other party
attaches to them the same meaning.
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b. If both parties know or have reason to know that the
manifestations of one of them are uncertain or ambiguous and
the parties attach different meanings to the manifestations, this
difference prevents the uncertain or ambiguous manifestations
from being operative as an offer or an acceptance.
c. If either party knows that the other does not intend what
his words or other acts express, this knowledge prevents such
words or other acts from being operative as an offer or an acceptance.
Comment
a. The mental assent of the parties is not requisite for the
formation of a contract. If the words or acts of one of the
parties have but one reasonable meaning, his intention is material
only in the exceptional case, stated in Clause (c), that an unreasonable meaning which he attaches to his manifestations is known
to the other party If the words or other acts of the parties
have more than one reasonable meaning, it must be determined
which of the possible meanings is to be taken. If either party
has reason to know that the other will give the words or acts
only one of these meanings and in fact the words or acts are so
understood, the party conscious of the ambiguity is bound in
accordance with that understanding. On the other hand, if a
party has no reason to suppose that there is ambiguity, he may
assert that his words or other acts bear the meaning that he
intended, that being one of their legitimate meanings, and he
will not be bound by a different meaning attached to them by
the other party
Annotation
That, in general, the undisclosed understanding of either party is
not material, see: 0. W. 0. & T. P Ry 4 Co. v. Rednower, 140 Ky. 370,
131 S. W. 179 (1910), Eagle Dist. Co. v. McFarland, 14 K. L. R. 860
(1893), Tunnell's Mil, etc., Road Co. v. Seleeman, 14 K. L. R. 174
(1892).
a. But if the parties attach different meanings to af ambiguous
manifestation which is reasonably unsuspected there is no contractTunne l's Mill, etc., Road Co. v. Selecman, supra (seemingly two things
of the same name and the court required there be a mutual understanding).
b. No Kentucky cases.
c. If one party knows that the other does not intend that which
his words clearly express, the words do not form a contract-Be7l v.
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Carroll,212 Ky. 231, 278 S. W 541 (1925), Germer v. Gambill, 140 Ky.
469, 131 S. W 268 (1910), Merceri v. Hickman.Ebert Co., 32 K. L. R.
230, 105 S. W 441 (1907).
Kentucky does not seem to follow the general rule as to mistakes
by agents of transmission. Although there is no reason to suspect a

mistake, one can not rely on the clear meaning of an offer contained in
a telegram since the offeror is only bound by the message he delivers
to the telegraph company-Postal Telg. C. Go. v. Schaefer, 110 Ky.
907, 62 S. W. 1119 (1901), Western Union Tel. Co. v. Fischer, 133 Ky
768, 119 S. W 189 (dicta), McKee v. Western Union Tel Co., 158 Ky.
143, 164 S. W 348 (1914). See also Western Union Tel Co. v. Cowin,
20 F (2d) 103 (1927), in accord with our decisions. Inconsistent with
this and in accord with the general rule, it has been held that the
words spoken by a telephone operator in "repeating" a message may
be shown in evidence against the one giving the message. This is
true although the recipient of the message authorized the operator to
talk for him-Squllivan v. Kuykendall, 82 Ky. 483 (1885).

Section 72.

ACCEPTANCE By SILENCE.

(1) Where an offeree fails to reply to an offer, bis silence
and inaction operate as an acceptance in the following cases and
in no others.
a. Where the offeree with reasonable opportunity to reject
offered services takes the benefit of them under circumstances
which would indicate to a reasonable man that they were offered
with the expectation of compensation.
b. Where the offeror has stated or given the offeree reason
to understand that assent may be manifested by silence or inaction, and the offeree in remaining silent and inactive intends to
accept the offer.
c. Where because of previous dealings or otherwise, the
offeree has given the offeror reason to understand that the silence
or inaction is intended by the offeree as a manifestation of assent,
and the offeror does so understand.
(2) Where the offeree exercises dominion over chattels
which are offered to him, such exercise of dominion in the absence
of other circumstances showing a contrary intention is an acceptance. If other circumstances indicate that the exercise of
dominion is tortious the offeror may at Ins option treat it as an
acceptance, though the offeree manifests an intention not to
accept.
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Annotation
Generally the offeree need make no reply to an offer as his silence
or inaction will not be construed as an acceptance--Cin. Equzp. Co. v.
Big M. Riv. C. C. Co., 158 Ky. 247, 164 S. W 794 (1914). It has even
been said, "the offeror cannot make silence on the offeree's part an
acceptance by a stipulation to that effect in the offer"--Kentucky P
C. & Coal Co. v. Steckel, 164 Ky. 420, 425, 175 S. W 663-but it is
clear that this dictum is not followed.
Subsection (1-a). Viley v. Pettit, 96 Ky. 576, 29 S. W 438 (accord).
Of course, the receipt of services without objection will not be sufficient
if at the time there was no expectation of compensation-St. Joseph's
Orphans Soc. v. Wolpert, 80 Ky. 86 (1882), Miller v. Cropper, 16 K. L.
R. 395 (1894)-nor if the recipient justifiedly believed they were
gratuitious-Evans' Ad.. v. McVey, 172 Ky. 1, 188 S. W 1075 (1916).
As to the effect of our Hospitality Act and the presumption that compensation is not expected when the parties are near relations or members of the same household, see the annotations under Section 5,
supra.
Subsection (1-b). No Kentucky, cases.
Subsection (1-c). If the offeree has led the offeror to believe that
the silence or inaction is an acceptance and the offeror so understands
it the contract is complete. This subsectfon includes cases involving
the acceptance and retention, without objection, of a writing purporting to be the agreement between the parties, as cited in Section 70,
supra. Failure to reject an order received through a traveling salesman may be construed as an acceptance after the lapse of a reasonable
iime-Bluegrass Cordage Co. v. Luthy & Co. 98 Ky. 583, 33 S. W. 835
(1896). Unless the delay is otherwise explained--Courtney Shoe Co.
v. Curd & "sons,142 Ky. 219, 134 S. W 146 (1911). This is particularly
true if the order is accompanied by a part payment which is retainedEnterprise Mfg. Co. v. Campbell, 121 S. W 1040 (1909).
Subsection (2). Our cases are in accord with this statement.
Caskey v. Williams Bros., 227 Ky. 73, 11 S. W (2d) 991 (1928) (acceptance of horses with knowledge of, although an objection to, the price
asked by the offeror), Star Drilling Mach. Co. v. McLeod, 122 Ky. 564,
92 S. W 558 (1906) (use of a machine offerefl-for sale), Clore's Sons
v; Johnson d Son, 21 K. L. R. 1685, 56 S. W 5 (1900), Caldwell &
Drake v. Cunnsngham, 162 Ky. 272, 172 S. W 498 (1915) (dispute as
to the contract price but acceptance of the goods with knowledge of
the price charged).

Section 73. EPFECT OF RECEIPT
OTHERWISE DEFECTIVE ACCEPTANCE.

By OFPEROR OP A LATE OR

An offeror who receives an acceptance which is too late or
winch is otherwise defective, cannot at Ins election regard it as
valid. The late or defective acceptance is a counter-offer winch
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must in turn be accepted by the original offeror in order to create
a contract.
Comment
a. How such a counter-offer as is referred to m the last
sentence of the section may be accepted depends on the general

principles which govern acceptance. In some cases Subsections
(b) or (c) of Section 72 (1) may be applicable.
Annotation
It is clear that the original offeror must accept a qualified acceptance or other counter offer-Shaw v. Ingraim-Day Lbr Co., 152 Ky. 329,
335, 153 S. W 431, New York Life Ins. Co. v. Levy, 122 Ky. 457, 92
S. W. 325 (1906). However, a failure to object to the qualifications
may give rise to a contract under Section 72 (1-c) or at least be evidence of their acceptance-Fazrmont GZass Works v. Crunien-MartinW
W Co., 106 Ky. 659, 51 S. W 196 (1899). No cases involving the receipt
of a late acceptance have been found.

Section 74.

TIME WHEN AND PLACE WHERE A CONTRACT

IS MADE.

A contract is made at the time when the last act necessary
for its formation is done, and at the place where that final act is
done.
Annotation
Our decisions agree with tis
statement. A contract is formed
when and where the last act essential to its validity is performed. If
the offer is an order for goods, the contract is formed where the order
is filled-,Tameson v. Gregory's Exr., 61 Ky. (4 Met.) 363 (1863). A
written contract is probably formed at the place of the last signature,
but if delivery is essential to its validity, the contract is made where
the instrument is delivered-Young v. Harris, 53 Ky. (14 B. M.) 447
(1854), and see Miller Bros. Co. v. Blackburn Coal Co., 212 Ky. 447,
279 S. W 618 (1926), and cases cited. When an acceptance is complete
on posting, the contract is formed at the place of posting-wan-Day
Lbr Co. v. Cornett, 161 Ky. 98, 170 S. W 516 (1914)-and at the time
of posting-Shaw v. Ingram-Day Lbr Co., 152 Ky. 329, 153 S. W 431.
This section is quoted with approval in Gannon v. Bronston, 246
Ky. 612.
(To be continued.)
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